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Abstract
We study the effect of altruism in two simple asset exchange models: the yard
sale model (winner gets a random fraction of the poorer player’s wealth) and the
theft and fraud model (winner gets a random fraction of the loser’s wealth). We
also introduce in these models the concept of bargaining efficiency, which makes
the poorer trader more aggressive in getting a favorable deal thus augmenting his
winning probabilities. The altruistic behavior is controlled by varying the number
of traders that behave altruistically and by the degree of altruism that they show.
The resulting wealth distribution is characterized using the Gini index. We compare
the resulting values of the Gini index at different levels of altruism in both models.
It is found that altruistic behavior does lead to a more equitable wealth distribution
but only for unreasonable high values of altruism that are difficult to expect in a
real economic system.
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1 Introduction
The study of wealth and income distributions in an economical system is a
problem of interest from both the practical and theoretical points of view
and, as expected, has a long history. Pareto did some of the first studies on
the subject (1). He proposed that the wealth and income distributions obey
universal power laws, but subsequent studies have shown that this is not the
case for the whole range of wealth values. Mandelbrot (2) proposed that the
Pareto conjecture only holds at the higher values of wealth and income. The
initial part (low wealth or income) of the distribution has been recently iden-
tified with the Gibbs distribution (3; 4; 5), while the middle part, according
to Gibrat (6), takes the form of a log–normal distribution.
Very recently, this and other aspects of the economy have been treated under
the “econophysics” point of view, mainly applying the ideas and tools of sta-
tistical mechanics and Monte Carlo simulations with some degree of success
and promising results (economists however, are still very skeptical about re-
sults obtained from these methods, see (7) for an interesting discussion). The
wealth distribution of any country, as many other economic quantities, results
from very complicated processes involving production, taxes, regulations and
even fraud. Despite this complexity, very simple models that provide some
insight into the whole process have been devised that qualitatively reproduce
some of the features of real economies.
We can treat an economy in its simplest form as an interchange of wealth
between pairs of people, or “agents” at successive instants of time (See Hayes
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(8) for an interesting review). Every time two agents interact, wealth flows
from one to the other according to some rule. In the so–called “yard sale”
(YS) model, the winner takes a random fraction of the wealth of the poorer
player, while in the “theft and fraud” (TF) model, the winner takes a random
fraction of the loser’s wealth. There is no production or consumption of wealth
in these models, nor taxes, savings etc. Under these circumstances, the yard
sale model produces a collapse of the economy: all the wealth ends in the hands
of a single agent, a phenomenon known as condensation. The theft and fraud
model on the other hand does not collapse but leads to a wealth distribution
given by the Gibbs distribution. See (9; 5; 4) for details.
The two models mentioned above are oversimplified, toy–model versions of a
real economy, and several authors have made some refinements to introduce
more realistic situations, for example, allowing the agents to go into debt (10),
change in the agents’ probability of winning according to the relative wealth of
the traders (11), constant and fractional savings (12), and altruistic behavior
(13), among others. In particular, the introduction of altruism in these models
has not been studied in depth, and therefore in this paper we investigate the
effect that altruistic behavior has on the dynamics of the models and the
changes that can produce in the distribution of wealth.
2 Models
In all models we use a fixed number N of individuals with an identical initial
amount of moneym to trade. The total wealth of the community, Nm, remains
fixed in time. At each time step, two traders i and j are chosen at random.
The winner (which is also randomly chosen) takes an amount T from the loser.
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The traders wealth w at time t+ 1, assuming that i is the winner, will be
wi(t + 1)=wi(t) + T (1)
wj(t + 1)=wj(t)− T. (2)
Then, another two traders interact, and the process is repeated N times, which
constitutes one Monte Carlo step (MCS). The amount T of the transaction is
defined as
T = αMIN(wi(t), wj(t)), (3)
for the YS model and
T = αwj(t), (4)
for the TF model assuming that agent j loses the transaction. The parameter
α is a uniformly distributed random number in the interval [0,1].
Altruistic behavior is introduced in the above models in the following way.
First, a certain fraction p of the N traders is defined as altruists. An altruistic
agent remains in that condition for the whole simulation. Second, a rate of
altruism r is defined and is the same for all of the pN altruistic agents. Suppose
that agents i and j trade at time t and that i is richer than j. If agent i wins
and is an altruist we will have
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + T − r(∆ + T ), (5)
wj(t + 1) = wj(t)− T + r(∆ + T ), (6)
where ∆ = (wi−wj)/2. With this definition, if an agent is not altruistic at all
(r = 0), the transactions proceed as in the original YS and TF models. If the
agent is totally altruistic (r = 1), the richer agent will give the other enough
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of his money so that their fortunes become equal.
Since both of the previous models can be considered too simplistic to represent
an economy, several attempts have been made to make these models more
realistic, as mentioned in the introduction. Here we follow Sihna (11), who
introduces a the concept of “bargaining efficiency”: a rich agent who owns
1000 units and loses 1 unit during a deal is only losing a 0.1% of his wealth.
However, an agent who loses the same 1 unit but whose wealth is of only 5
units is losing 20% of his fortune. Therefore it is expected that in a trade
between a rich and a poor agent, the poorer will be more aggressive in getting
a favorable deal, and that the aggressiveness will be a function of the relative
wealths of the agents.
The implementation of the above concept is made via the following “Fermi
function”: The probability that agent i wins in a trade with agent j is given
by:
p(i|i, j) =
1
1 + exp(β[ xi
xj
− 1])
, (7)
where β parametrizes the significance of the relative wealth of the agents. For
any β > 0, the poorer agent has a greater probability of winning the trade.
3 Results for the YS and TF models with altruism
We first investigate the effect of altruism in the YS model. In order to quantify
the inequality in the wealth distribution we use the Gini index (14) defined as
G =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 |xi − xj |
2N2µ
, (8)
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where µ is the average wealth. A perfect distribution of wealth where every-
body has the same amount of money will give a value of G = 0. The other
extreme where one individual has all the money has a Gini value of 1.
It is known that in this model we have condensation: all the money ends up
in the hands of a single trader, which represents the extreme case of wealth
inequality. Altruism does not change this situation. In figure 1 we see the re-
sults of several simulations with 1000 traders that start with an initial fortune
of 100 (these values will remain fixed for all the simulations in this paper). In
the curve with open circles we have p = r = 0, that is, the pure YS model
without altruism at all. Condensation takes place at about 1000 MCS. If we
introduce altruism, condensation still takes place, the only difference is that it
takes longer to reach. The curve with solid circles has values of p = r = 0.95,
almost everybody is near totally altruistic, however, only at the beginning we
see a difference in the Gini index compared to the pure YS model. As time
goes by, we quickly arrive at the condensate phase. Only when we set p = 1, or
everybody is altruistic, we get saturation of the Gini index. In the figure, the
curve with crosses has p = 1 and r = 0.1 which gives a value of G = 0.62. This
saturation is, however, uninteresting since the addition of a single non–altruist
takes the system to the condensate phase.
In the TF model condensation does not take place. The effect of altruism has
been studied by using several values for the fraction and rate of altruism in
the model. For each set of values of p and r we let the system reach a stable
distribution at about 300 MCS and obtain a value for the Gini index. As figure
2 shows, at low values of p and r the Gini index is high, resulting in an uneven
distribution of wealth. Higher values of altruism result in a lower value of G,
as expected.
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4 Introducing bargaining efficiency in the transactions
We now introduce the bargaining efficiency concept in the models. Figures 3
and 4 show the results for the TF and YS models respectively. It is interesting
that the condensation that occurs in the YS model disappears with the imple-
mentation of this scheme. This is illustrated in figure 4. Note that, comparing
with the TF model (figure 2), the YS model with bargaining efficiency yields
lower values of the Gini index for the same degree of altruism, that is, in order
to attain a certain value of G, we need lower values of r and p in the YS model
with bargaining efficiency (with β = 1) than in the stand–alone TF model.
If we compare the results for the TF model with and without bargaining
efficiency (figures 2 and 3), we see that G is smaller in the bargaining efficiency
case, but only for small values of the altruism parameters. In fact, for some
values of these parameters, the wealth is better distributed in the stand–alone
TF model. This is shown in figure 5. What the data in this figure says is: if
you take a TF economy without altruism, the addition of bargaining efficiency
(giving the poor more chances to win) reduces the Gini index, that is, the
wealth is more evenly distributed. However, if, in addition to the fact that the
chances to win are biased in favor of the poor you also have altruism in your
economy, then at a certain point, the pure TF economy performs better in
terms of wealth distribution.
This behavior can be understood in the following way. Take the case of no
altruists at all. In this situation the money is changing hands all the time, and
at any point in time you can find extremely rich agents and very poor ones,
which gives you a high value for G. If in these conditions you give the poor
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more chances to win then you are leveling the field and G diminishes. This is
the behavior at low values of r in figure 5. Now take the other extreme, almost
everyone is altruistic at a high rate. Every time a rich wins a poor, he will give
the poor money so that their fortunes will be almost the same. This situation
gives you a low value for G, but if now you give the poor more chances to win
in addition to the altruism which is already helping him, then they benefit in
excess and G increases.
We finally perform a set of simulations to study the effect of changing the ag-
gressiveness of bargaining, which is controlled by the parameter β. The higher
value of this parameter, the most chances has the poorer of the two traders
to win the transaction. These simulations emphasize the behavior discussed
above. By enhancing the bargaining efficiency, the Gini index decreases, but
only when the altruism is low, for example when r = p = 0.4 (see the upper
curve in figure 6). When altruism is high the behavior is interesting, since
the Gini index first begins to decrease when β increases, and then reaches a
minimum value and starts to increase for higher values of β. This means that
there is an optimum value for the bargaining parameter β for which the wealth
distribution reaches its more equitable form, at least under the Gini criteria.
In figure 7 we present similar curves as in figure 6 but for the YS model. In
this case the Gini index decreases monotonically as β increases, except for
the bottom curve where there is a very small increment in G after the initial
decrease.
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5 Conclusions
We have investigated the effect of altruistic behavior in the YS and TF models
with and without bargaining efficiency. We found that it is no easy to get rid
of the condensate phase (when a single agent owns all the wealth) in the YS
model. Only in the extreme case of 100% altruists condensation does not take
place. When bargaining efficiency is introduced in the YS model, condensa-
tion is effectively avoided and a stable wealth distribution is achieved. The
distribution of wealth becomes more equitable as the altruism is increased. In
the stand–alone TF model, it is also observed that G decreases when altruism
is increased.
The introduction of bargaining efficiency gives interesting results since, for
small values of altruism, it has the effect of decreasing the Gini index and
thus leads to a better wealth distribution, however, at high values of altruism
it can have the contrary effect and increase the value of G, and this behavior
is more pronounced in the TF model. This implies that in these models, when
high rates of altruism are present, there is no necessity of giving the poor more
chances to win, because the wealth distribution will get worst.
An important point is that, despite the fact that we do observe a better
distribution of wealth in both models when the altruism is increased, this effect
is observed only at too high values of the altruism parameters. For example,
in the stand–alone TF model, the value of the Gini index without altruism is
about 0.65. From figure 2 we can see that in order to decrease it only to 0.55 we
need to have approximately half of the population behaving as altruists, with
an altruism rate of about 0.3. A value of r = 0.3 means that the rich agent
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will give the poor one 30% of the difference in their fortunes, a value that is
hard to expect in real life. Of course, we are dealing here with oversimplified
models but, as other authors have found, they can be valuable to shed some
light in a very complex issue, and our findings indicate that altruism cannot
be expected to change the way wealth is distributed in a significant way.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. Time evolution of the Gini index in the YS model. Open circles are
for a simulation without altruism at all. Solid circles are for 95% of altruists
and 0.95 of altruism. Crosses are for 100% of altruists and 0.1 of altruism.
Figure 2. Contour plot of the Gini index as function of the fraction of altruists
p and the rate of altruism r in the TF model. Results are averaged over at
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least 5000 realizations.
Figure 3. Contour plot of the Gini index as function of the fraction of altruists
p and the rate of altruism r for the TF model with bargaining efficiency with
β = 1. Results are averaged over at least 5000 realizations.
Figure 4. Same as figure 3 but for the YS model with bargaining efficiency,
and β = 1. Results are averaged over at least 5000 realizations.
Figure 5. Curves of G as function of r for a fixed value of p = 0.9. The curve
with open circles is the stand–alone TF model, while the filled circles curve is
for the TF model with bargaining eficiency and β = 1.
Figure 6. The Gini index as function of the bargaining parameter β under the
TF dynamics. Each curve is for different altruism parameters, which, from
top to bottom curves, are the following: r = p = {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}.
Results are averaged over 1000 realizations.
Figure 7. The Gini index as function of the bargaining parameter β under the
YS dynamics. Each curve is for different altruism parameters, which, from top
to bottom curves, are the following: r = p = {0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.95}. Results are
averaged over at least 1000 realizations.
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